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This article critically reviews techniques and theories relevant to the emerging field of
“lie detection by inducing cognitive load selectively on liars.” To help these techniques
benefit from past mistakes, we start with a summary of the polygraph-based Controlled
Question Technique (CQT) and the major criticisms of it made by the National Research
Council (2003), including that it not based on a validated theory and administration proce-
dures have not been standardized. Lessons from the more successful Guilty Knowledge
Test are also considered. The critical review that follows starts with the presentation of
models and theories offering insights for cognitive lie detection that can undergird theoret-
ically load-inducing approaches. This is followed by evaluation of specific research-based,
load-inducing proposals, especially for their susceptibility to rehearsal and other coun-
termeasures. To help organize these proposals and suggest new direction for innovation
and refinement, a theoretical taxonomy is presented based on the type of cognitive load
induced in examinees (intrinsic or extraneous) and how open-ended the responses to test
items are. Finally, four recommendations are proffered that can help researchers and prac-
titioners to avert the corresponding mistakes with the CQT and yield new, valid cognitive
lie detection technologies.
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The seemingly disparate fields of “polygraph-based lie detection”
and “research and theory on social-cognitive aspects of deception”
seldom communicate. Still, lessons from the former may benefit
attempts made from the latter perspective to detect lies. A goal
of this critical review is to advance a new research area of the
social-cognitive perspective, “lie detection by inducing cognitive
load selectively on liars,” to develop on valid theoretical grounds
and avoid other pitfalls that hampered the Controlled Question
Technique (CQT), a questioning paradigm used with the poly-
graph. To this end, the CQT is summarized and major criticisms
of it made by the National Research Council (2003) are shared.
Some of them are that it is not based on a valid theory and is
highly susceptible to countermeasures. Also summarized is the
more successful polygraph-based Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT,
a.k.a. the Concealed Knowledge Test), which overcomes many of
these concerns (Lykken, 1998). With these lessons in mind and
to help load-inducing lie detection efforts to develop on valid
theoretical grounds, the critical review begins with discussion of
models and theories relevant to the cognition of deception for
their insights on cues to deception. Next, we consider the specific
proposals appearing in the literature that try to make it cognitively
more difficult to lie than to tell the truth, especially for their suscep-
tibility to countermeasures. Then, a taxonomy of load-inducing
lie detection is presented to organize these proposals and open up
new research avenues. Coming full circle, we conclude with four
recommendations for researchers and practitioners to avoid the
corresponding problems with the CQT.
SUMMARY OF POLYGRAPH-BASED LIE DETECTION: ITS
USES, PITFALLS, AND SUCCESSES
This section is not part of the review. Rather, it is a summary of
certain aspects of polygraph-based lie detection. Critical reviews
in this area are available elsewhere (e.g., Lykken, 1998; National
Research Council, 2003). The polygraph is a device that contin-
uously records psycho-physiological arousal as assessed by pulse
rate, blood pressure, respiration rate, and skin conductivity, which
has been applied to uncover deception. The most common ques-
tioning paradigm used with it for detecting lies is the CQT. In a
typical test, an examinee is given a pretest interview for gather-
ing information that can serve as the basis for control questions.
Once questions are chosen, the examiner will preview them with
the examinee to ensure that the questions are understood and do
not surprise the examinee when asked later. During the exam,
irrelevant questions are asked such as “What is your name?” along
with control questions that most people tend to lie to. For exam-
ple, “Have you ever stolen anything from the workplace?” Finally,
relevant questions probe the issue central to the exam (e.g., “Did
you kill . . .?”). The questions usually elicit brief answers. A liar
is hypothesized to show more arousal to relevant questions than
to control questions, whereas an innocent individual (truth teller)
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should show more arousal to control questions than to relevant
questions (Lykken, 1998). Law enforcement and federal agencies
in the USA use the CQT as a screening device for hiring and
retaining employes and as a tool for criminal investigations. The
CQT has been used to verify victim’s statements, evaluate the
veracity of witnesses, and to exonerate suspects. Still, test results
are largely inadmissible in US courtrooms (National Research
Council, 2003).
The validity of the CQT has been challenged in a 2003 report
by a distinguished panel of scientists of the National Research
Council, which reviewed all available scientific studies and offered
several criticisms. Among the most serious, the administration
procedures for the CQT have not been standardized. The paradigm
has a high rate of false positives (honest individuals misclassified
as liars), is highly susceptible to countermeasures, and the results
of examinations are subjectively scored. The criticism most ger-
mane here is that the CQT is not based on a theory of deception
that has been validated. For instance, an assumption central to the
CQT, that lying causes more sympathetic nervous system arousal
than truth telling, is unsubstantiated. The panel called for research
on alternatives. Many of these criticisms are translated later in
this article into specific recommendations for advancing cogni-
tive load-inducing lie detection techniques in ways that overcome
these criticisms.
Partly in response to the validity concerns with the CQT, the
GKT was proposed. It is a questioning paradigm that can be used
with the polygraph to uncover the false denials of examinees
by exposing whether they possess “guilty knowledge”, presum-
ably resulting from their participation in a crime (Lykken, 1998).
During a GKT, the examinee is presented with multiple-choice
questions, each having one relevant alternative (correct answer)
and several neutral alternatives (plausible distractors). The latter
should be chosen such that an innocent person could not dis-
criminate them from the relevant alternative (Lykken, 1998). An
example of a relevant question is “How was the victim killed?”
with the response alternatives of “shot,”“stabbed,”“struck,”“stran-
gled,” or “poisoned.” This question could be re-asked multiple
times, along with other questions probing different aspects of
a crime scene. The examinee does not even need to answer.
If heightened arousal occurs consistently to relevant responses,
then the examinee may be concealing knowledge as the per-
petrator. The GKT assumes that innocent examinees could not
have acquired guilty knowledge indirectly and that guilty exam-
inees encoded guilty knowledge and have retained it (Elaad,
1990).
Some validity concerns with the CQT were resolved in the GKT,
including more standardization of the procedure, more appro-
priate control alternatives, fewer false positives, and a stronger
theoretical basis (Lykken, 1998; Carmel et al., 2003). Also, beyond
the psycho-physiological measures of the polygraph, guilty knowl-
edge has been demonstrated with the diverse cues of response
time (Seymour et al., 2000; Seymour and Kerlin, 2008; Seymour
and Fraynt, 2009), event-related potentials (Rosenfeld et al., 1988,
2006), and pupil dilation (Dionisio et al., 2001), among others.
The relative success of the GKT also offers lessons for the devel-
opment of load-inducing lie detection techniques, especially that
they should be based on a valid theory. Still, the GKT is limited in
the deception it can uncover to the false denials of those possessing
guilty knowledge.
MODELS/THEORIES ADVANCING UNDERSTANDING OF THE
COGNITION OF DECEPTION
Recalling that the CQT is not based on a validated theory of
deception, we next review models and theories offering insights
on the cognition of deception to help new load-inducing lie detec-
tion techniques to advance on solid theoretical ground. As will
be discussed later, most of them lack such a foundation. Some
accounts were proposed to explain social aspects of deceit, but
offer important cognitive insights.
SELECTED ACCOUNTS UNDERGIRDING THE GUILTY KNOWLEDGE TEST
Various theoretical accounts of how the GKT works have been
proposed. Two are particularly relevant to the cognition of decep-
tion. The first, Orienting Response Theory, focuses on attentional
processes. According to it, individuals tend to orient and attend
carefully to environmental stimuli that are novel or emotionally
significant to them, thereby preparing themselves to respond adap-
tively as necessary (Sokolov, 1963). Applied to the GKT, an orient-
ing response naturally occurs in guilty examinees on exposure
to relevant knowledge, as evidenced, for instance, by a lowering
of heart rate, but not to neutral alternatives (Verschuere et al.,
2010). It can manifest behaviorally in longer response times to
process a stimulus (Seymour et al., 2000) and in other ways. A
defensive response to a relevant option is also possible if an exam-
inee feels threatened, characterized by increased heart rate and by
other signs of arousal. The orienting response to guilty knowledge
is hypothesized to be automatic and hard to suppress (Lykken,
1998).
Seymour (2001) proposed a memory-based alternative to Ori-
enting Response Theory called the Parallel Task Set (PTS) model,
which explains the“guilty knowledge effect”via response competi-
tion. PTS holds that an examinee’s responses to the alternatives of
a question of the GKT consist of the following: memory processes,
response selection, response preparation, and motor execution.
These four components comprise a task set. Two task sets are
hypothesized to occur independently and in parallel for each ques-
tion. The familiarity task set occurs quickly and involves automatic
priming mechanisms. The recollection task set, on the other hand,
occurs more slowly, is under conscious control, and draws on
cognitive resources. In the case of the relevant alternative, two
inconsistent response requests can be received by a particular
response processor (e.g., that controlling verbal utterances). In
this case, the one received from the familiar task set is for a truth-
ful response while another from the recollection task set is for a
deceptive response. One response can also be received while the
other response is underway. In both cases, response conflict occurs.
Hiding guilty knowledge is postulated to activate conflict resolu-
tion, which involves the examinee overriding the familiar response
and executing the intended response of denying the guilty knowl-
edge. This model explains the longer response times needed to do
so as resulting from the additional processing steps of the recollec-
tion task set and the resolution of response conflict. The general
insights that the PTS model offers for lie detection are to under-
score the centrality of memory processes in deception and truth
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telling and the fact that the inhibition of a familiar response is
often part of deception. Both accounts of the GKT imply that
the possession of guilty knowledge manifests in implicit memory
measures, which are subtle and hard to hide (Anderson, 2000).
FOUR-FACTOR THEORY
Zuckerman et al. (1981) proposed the influential Four-Factor The-
ory of deception. It postulates that deception involves (a) general-
ized arousal, (b) anxiety, guilt, and other emotions accompanying
deception, (c) cognitive components, and (d) liars’ attempts to
control verbal and non-verbal cues to appear honest. Although
these authors speculate that lying imposes greater cognitive load
than truth telling, which can result in longer response times, more
pupil dilation, and in other signs of load, the theory does not
detail the cognitive mechanisms of lying. Still, it highlights the
complex, multidimensional nature of deception, and the many
types of behavior (e.g., cognitive, physiological, emotional) that
are potential cues.
INTERPERSONAL DECEPTION THEORY
Interpersonal Deception Theory (Buller and Burgoon, 1996; Bur-
goon and Buller, 2008) focuses on the dynamic, interdependent
nature of verbal and non-verbal exchanges between the liar and
target (the intended recipient of a deception). Specifically, it
describes deception as involving (a) an interaction in which each
party of a communicative dyad is monitoring the behavior and
responding to cues from the other. (b) The use of strategic decep-
tion is postulated to impose a cognitive load on liars absent in
truth tellers. Deceivers must consciously manipulate informa-
tion to create a plausible message, appear honest as they share
it, monitor targets’ reactions, and perform other mental tasks. (c)
Too many concurrent tasks produce “cognitive overload,” result-
ing in some behavior going unmonitored. (d) Signs of deception
include uncertainty and vagueness in the detail of a false narra-
tive, non-immediacy of responses that involve frequent pausing,
and withdrawal by sitting away from targets. Liars use disassocia-
tions to distance themselves from acts of deception, for instance,
by describing their actions in a false narrative as going along with
the group rather than as resulting from a personal choice.
Four-Factor Theory and Interpersonal Deception Theory posit
that a leakage of cues can accompany liars’ strategic control over
behavior, especially under high cognitive load. In their review,
Zuckerman et al. (1981) found the most reliable leaked cues were
the use of self-adaptors (fidgeting hand movements), increased
blinking and pupil dilation, heightened voice pitch, and speech
errors (grammatical mistakes, slips of the tongue), pausing, and
other speech hesitations, and discrepancies between verbal and
non-verbal channels. Some cognitive load-inducing techniques we
review exploit the fact that under high cognitive load, it is hard for
examinees to monitor and control certain channels of behavior,
which may maximize the leakage of non-verbal cues as a result.
PREOCCUPATION MODEL OF SECRECY
The cognitive load of lies of omission is central to Lane and Weg-
ner’s (1995) Preoccupation Model of Secrecy. It postulates that
when individuals keep secrets, for instance, one from a spouse
about having been unfaithful, (a) the strategy most often used is
thought suppression. (“I will stop thinking about having cheated to
avoid accidentally blurting it.”) (b) Over time, this ongoing sup-
pression can cause the secret to intrude in the thoughts of the
individual. (“I can’t stop thinking about what I did.”) (c) Intru-
sive thoughts renew attempts at thought suppression. (“I will try
harder to block the memory.”) (d) This cycle can escalate to the
point that the individual obsesses over the memory long after a
secret has been divulged. As does the PTS model, this account notes
the difficulty often involved in concealing “guilty knowledge.”
In four studies,Lane and Wegner (1995) found support for steps
a through d and evidence that keeping a secret over time, iron-
ically, increases its accessibility above other memories. Although
this model focuses on lies of omission, it has relevance to deception
generally. Since most lying involves keeping a secret by withhold-
ing some truth, it may help explain the fact that an allocation of
cognitive resources is often required to inhibit responding truth-
fully (Pennebaker and Chew, 1985; Johnson et al., 2004; Kozel
et al., 2004; Osman et al., 2009), just as it occurs in thought sup-
pression. Expanding this account, for instance, by integrating it
with the PTS model, should increase understanding of when lying
requires cognitive resources to inhibit the truth and thereby help
pinpoint when cognitive load indices make the most reliable cues
to deception. Also, if secret truths become more accessible over
time, they may be inadvertently blurted under high cognitive load,
an implication of this model for lie detection. Finally, like the PTS
model, the Preoccupation model emphasizes memory processes
in deception, which in this case is for the active suppression of the
truth.
SELF-PRESENTATION THEORY
DePaulo (1992) proposed a Self-Presentation Theory of individ-
uals’ control over their non-verbal behavior to create specific
impressions in the minds of others, including deceptive ones.
Three cognitive phases are thought to occur. (a) First, an intention
to regulate one’s behavior is formed to create a desired impres-
sion. (b) Then, the intended self-presentation is translated into
non-verbal behaviors. (c) Finally, performance is appraised by the
individual, if possible, and lessons are learned for the improve-
ment of future performance. There are obstacles to steps (b) and
(c). To note a few, many non-verbal behaviors are hard to monitor,
control, or inhibit continuously, such as the expression of basic
emotions on the face or the tone of one’s voice (Ekman, 2001).
Moreover, the non-verbal behaviors emitted are often more acces-
sible to observers than to those producing them, which makes
self-appraisal difficult (DePaulo, 1992).
Although not all self-presentations are deceptive, this account
can be regarded as a theory of non-verbal deception. It is con-
sistent with other accounts in that deception involves the intent
to misrepresent (Ekman, 2001). Also, like Four-Factor Theory
and Interpersonal Deception Theory, it posits that leaked non-
verbal cues can signal deception. This account offers more insights
than the others on the thought processes involved in looking at a
potential lie from the target’s perspective.
AWORKING MEMORY MODEL OF DECEPTION
Sporer and Schwandt (2006, 2007) recently offered a Working
Memory Model of deception, which is based on Baddeley’s (1992,
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2000) influential working memory theory. It too contends that
lying imposes a greater load than truth telling due to its heav-
ier processing requirements. Truth telling involves retrieving and
reconstructing a memory. When lying, deceivers must invent new
stories or modify those available from past experiences or scripts.
A deceptive narrative must be plausible and not contradict itself
or what the target knows. When no personal memories or scripts
are available for lie construction, the working memories of liars
will be heavily burdened, reducing capacity for speech production.
Liars must also monitor listeners for signs of suspiciousness.
This model’s most unique insights regard the information
sources liars use to construct deceptive narratives. It also suggests
that cognitive load indices can make reliable cues when exami-
nees are surprised by test items probing details that are likely to be
part of the memory of a truthful experience, but not a deceptive
narrative.
THE ACTIVATION-DECISION-CONSTRUCTION MODEL OF ANSWERING
DECEPTIVELY
The Activation-Decision-Construction Model (ADCM; Walczyk
et al., 2003, 2005, 2009) describes answering questions deceptively,
which theoretically includes the multiple-choice questions of the
GKT. The model analyzes the act into three components. First, a
question heard or read activates the truth from long-term mem-
ory,usually automatically. Second,based on the activated truth and
social context, a decision to lie may be made, usually to advance
liars’ interests. Truthful answering will then be actively inhibited,
especially for well practiced truths that can proactively interfere
with lying. Such response competition is elegantly described by
the PTS model. Third, a context-appropriate lie is constructed
that must be coherent and plausible. When possible, memories
of the truth are altered slightly for the sake of lie plausibility and
to minimize the cognitive load of lie construction. Finally, a lie is
shared.
Walczyk et al. (2009) expanded the ADCM to account for the
rehearsal of deceptive answers. “Deciding to lie” becomes“remem-
ber to lie,”with relevant questions and social contexts serving as the
memory cues. “Lie construction” becomes “lie recall,” followed by
tweaking of the deceptive answers to fit the prevailing social con-
text, both entailing lower loads than spontaneous lying. Responses
to questions using the CQT are usually made in less than a second
(Lykken, 1998). The expanded ADCM can easily account for this as
follows. Either before the exam or during the preview of questions,
a deceptive examinee will decide which questions she/he will lie
to and will construct deceptive answers. Delivering them during
an exam involves cued recall, which typically occurs automatically
and quickly (Anderson, 2000).
Several elements of the ADCM have been supported. Walczyk
et al. (2003) found, according to self-reports, when participants
answered questions deceptively that the truth entered working
memory automatically and interfered with lying, consistent with
the activation and decision components. Walczyk et al. (2009)
demonstrated that individuals lying about well practiced truths
had the most difficulty due to a Stroop-like interference. In having
participants answer questions about various aspects of their lives
either deceptively or truthfully, Walczyk et al. (2005) showed that
having to decide to lie adds to cognitive load, and constructing
a lie caused greater load than truth telling. One of the ADCM’s
implications for lie detection is that when the truth can be pre-
activated in examinees and questions are asked that examinees do
not anticipate, the processes of deciding to lie and lie construction
will manifest as higher cognitive load in liars alone.
GENERAL EVALUATION OF THE MODELS/THEORIES
The range of models and theories above illustrates the multifar-
iousness of deception. No single theory could account for all of
its cognitive complexity. Generally, these accounts are most rele-
vant to spontaneous (unrehearsed) lying. In such cases, the cues to
deception tend to be the richest, including longer response times
and more pupil dilation (DePaulo et al., 2003). To be relevant to
load-inducing lie detection, they must be expanded to account for
rehearsed deception, a likely countermeasure. For instance, Inter-
personal Deception Theory holds that liars actively monitor their
behavior and that of the targets. This may not apply to highly
skilled or practiced liars. As suggested by the expanded ADCM,
the memory processes of encoding and retrieval will be central
to these expansions and become highly automated with practice
(Anderson, 2000).
LIE DETECTION VIA INDUCING COGNITIVE LOAD
Recently an innovative general approach to lie detection has
emerged: cognitive load-inducing techniques designed to elicit
greater mental effort in liars than in truth tellers (Walczyk et al.,
2005; Vrij et al., 2008a). Whereas polygraph-based questioning
paradigms rely on elevation in physiological arousal to gauge
deception, these use the heightening of indices of cognitive load
as the primary cues. Another contrast, although surprising exami-
nees with questions is discouraged in the CQT, given the high rate
of false positives that can result (Lykken, 1998), surprising (not
shocking) examinees with questions or the task used to access
the truth is central to many load-inducing techniques to make it
hard to lie. Some techniques below elicit brief responses, as do the
CQT and GKT. Others elicit more open-ended responding, such
as narratives.
The models and theories above can advance these techniques
by showing when and why load indices provide reliable cues (Vrij
et al., 2008a). Rather than reviewing all published variations on
a common theme, generally only distinctive research-based pro-
posals are discussed, along with their pitfalls and limitations. The
results of the experiments testing them show that liars and truth
tellers can be classified beyond chance. However, we do NOT
discuss the rates of false positives or false negatives for these tech-
niques, because it is far too early in their development to estimate
such parameters accurately. This is especially true given that most
research is based on college students, not suspects under police
interrogation or other authentic samples. Thus, such estimates
would be misleading.
TIME RESTRICTED INTEGRITY-CONFIRMATION
Walczyk et al. (2005) proposed a load-inducing technique called
Time Restricted Integrity-Confirmation (TRI-Con). It is based
explicitly on a theoretical account of the differences in men-
tal states between liars and truth tellers, the ADCM. TRI-Con
selectively enhances load of liars by surprising examinees with
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science February 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 14 | 4
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Walczyk et al. Cognitive load-induced lie detection
unanticipated questions and by requiring quick responses. These
specific guidelines apply to examinations (Walczyk et al., 2005,
2009). (a) Examinees are prompted about the focus of the question
set to follow (e.g., “The next 11 questions concern your activities
at the time of the crime”). By priming relevant episodic “truths,”
prompts reduce examinees’need to search memory to answer hon-
estly, making cognitive load indices less ambiguous cues that show
when a decision to lie and lie construction have occurred. Prompt-
ing also reduces the emotional surprise that might be caused by
blindsiding examinees with questions probing sensitive issues or
incriminating information. (b) Still, the specific questions are not
disclosed until asked during an exam, thus surprising examinees
cognitively and reducing the rehearsal of lies. (c) Questions are
written when possible to be unclear regarding what truths are tar-
geted until they are fully asked. This reduces further examinees’
chance of preparing lies. (d) To obtain clear assessment of the
cognitive load needed to answer completely, questions are writ-
ten to be answerable with one or a few words. (e) Examinees
are instructed to answer as quickly as possible to limit further
their opportunity to deceive. The high cognitive load of rapid
responding to surprise questions may increase cue leakage in the
form of voice pitch elevation, pupil dilation, reduced blinking, and
long response times because of the limited opportunity for liars
to self-monitor and control (Zuckerman et al., 1981; Buller and
Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon and Buller, 2008) and may increase acci-
dental blurting of the truth (Lane and Wegner, 1995). (f) Without
adequate preparation, liars’ deceptive accounts should be incom-
plete. Questions are asked and then re-asked along with logically
interrelated questions to increase liars’ cognitive load. Contradic-
tions should occur with liars (Granhag and Hartwig, 2008). (g)
Behavioral baselines for ground-truth answers are established for
all cognitive load indices for comparison with levels of these cues of
answers suspected of deception. This practice controls for individ-
ual differences in behavioral base rates and improves the accuracy
of lie detection (Walters, 1996; Bond and DePaulo, 2006).
Studies have shown the effectiveness of TRI-Con for uncover-
ing deception. Following these guidelines, Walczyk et al. (2005)
instructed adults to lie or tell the truth to questions about vari-
ous aspects of their lives (e.g., employment history, performance
on standardized tests). Using response time as the cue, discrimi-
nant analyses allowed classification of liars and truth tellers well
above chance. Walczyk et al. (2009) tested TRI-Con again by asking
participants to lie or tell the truth about their lives and included
a rehearsal condition in which participants prepared deceptive
answers. The consistency of answers across interrelated questions
was added as a cue. Liars and truth tellers were classified up to
89% accurately. The analyses showed that rehearsed deception is
detectable. Finally,Walczyk et al. (2012) tested TRI-Con in a foren-
sically relevant context. “Witnesses” observed actual crime videos,
then later told the truth or lied rehearsed or unrehearsed about
them during interrogation. The cognitive cues were response time,
answer consistency, eye movements, and pupil dilation. Discrim-
inant analyses allowed classification of the three conditions 69%
accurately, 33% expected by chance.
Despite these promising results, TRI-Con has limitations. For
instance, extended narratives given by examinees provide valuable
verbal cues to deception (Buller and Burgoon, 1996; Sporer and
Schwandt, 2007) that the short answers of TRI-Con are unlikely
to tap. Moreover, pupil dilation, blinking rate, voice pitch eleva-
tion, and other reliable cues not only measure cognitive load but
emotional responses as well (DePaulo et al., 2003). TRI-Con and
the techniques to be described may elicit not only cognitive load
but also anxiety in examinees. This fact is not problematic when
it can be assumed that both anxiety and cognitive load co-vary
with deception (Vrij et al., 2010b). Finally, TRI-Con does not allow
participants to qualify their answers during the exam, unlike open-
ended responses. However, these limitations can be overcome by
combining diverse techniques, a possibility discussed later.
COUNTERMEASURES
After new methods of lie detection are introduced, information
about them disseminates, and countermeasures are devised. This
occurred with the polygraph (Lykken, 1998; National Research
Council,2003) and is occurring with cutting edge approaches, such
as functional magnetic resonance imaging (Simpson, 2008; Ganis
et al., 2011). Noting this, Walczyk et al. (2005, 2009, 2012) argued
that a likely countermeasure against load-inducing lie detection
is the rehearsal of a lie, a load reduction strategy (O’Hair et al.,
1981; Greene et al., 1985). All research and theory in this area
must consider rehearsal. For TRI-Con, other possible countermea-
sures include examinees intentionally not complying with instruc-
tions to answer quickly (e.g., ask that a question be repeated).
Likely countermeasures against other load-inducing proposals are
discussed as they are presented.
ASKING UNANTICIPATED QUESTIONS AND SOLICITING SURPRISE
DRAWINGS
Asking questions that examinees do not expect may increase cog-
nitive load. Vrij et al. (2009) instructed pairs of participants to lie
or tell the truth about having had lunch together. All pairs then
prepared for an interview, which included anticipating likely ques-
tions. General and unanticipated questions were later asked, the
latter probing minor details like these. What color shirt was worn?
Who arrived first? Who sat closest to the door? Inconsistencies in
answers to such questions enabled observers to classify liars and
truth tellers beyond chance,as did discrepancies in the surprise pic-
tures that the pairs were asked to draw of the layout of the restau-
rant. Although investigators did not measure the cognitive loads
elicited by surprising participants with unexpected questions or
the drawing task, we regard both to be load-inducing techniques,
because respondents likely had to think a lot when answering or
drawing to ensure plausibility and consistently since responding
to both was unrehearsed (DePaulo et al., 2003). Recently, Vrij et al.
(2012b) observed that truth tellers’ drawings of their workplaces
contained more plausible details, especially those involving their
coworkers, than liars doing the same.
These results are encouraging. Still, asking unanticipated ques-
tions has limitations. Recall that once knowledge of this technique
disseminates, liars may include spatial and other obscure details
into their deceptive narratives in anticipation of such questions.
Second, memory for minor details can easily go unnoticed by
truth tellers (Loftus, 2007), making the response “I can’t remem-
ber.” plausible when given by liars. The same concerns hold for
drawing pictures. Liars can practice drawing them in advance or
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plausibly deny having noticed spatial details. Still, refinement of
these techniques may overcome such concerns.
MAINTAINING EYE CONTACT WITH THE EXAMINER
Having to maintain eye contact with another can elevate cognitive
load and anxiety in liars. In support, Vrij et al. (2010b) directed
some participants to lie to interview questions; others told the
truth. Some were further instructed to maintain continuous eye
contact with the interviewer. Observers of videotapes of the inter-
views were better at discriminating liars from truth tellers when
eye contact was maintained, suggesting that it imposed greater
cognitive load and anxiety on liars.
One possible countermeasure is practicing lying while main-
taining eye contact with another, which may lessen liar-truth teller
differences. Also, sustaining eye contact might prove ineffective
with Japanese and those of other non-Western cultures for whom
this behavior goes against societal norms. It might induce inor-
dinately high levels of anxiety and be distracting, even for truth
tellers (McCarthy et al., 2006). Thus, it is unclear how effective
this proposal can be as a general load-inducing technique for
distinguishing liars and truth tellers.
RECOUNTING EVENTS IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER
The temporal order in which events are recalled can magnify cues
to deception. Vrij et al. (2008b) directed half their participants
to lie and the other half to tell the truth about what happened
during a staged event. Some participants of each condition were
further instructed to report events in reverse chronological order.
Others reported in chronological order only. More cues to decep-
tion emerged and were noticed by observers in the reverse order
recounting. The authors noted that recalling in reverse order runs
contrary to the typical forward chronological encoding of events
and thus imposes a heavy load, especially for liars.Vrij et al. (2012a)
extended this technique by asking individuals to lie or tell the truth
about a route they took in chronological and in reverse chronolog-
ical order. More cues to deception again emerged and were noted
by observers in the reverse order retelling.
If liars practice lying in reverse chronological order will the cues
to deception be as rich? Another likely countermeasure to cover
their involvement in crimes, clever perpetrators might base their
false alibis on episodic memories of actual events, altering details
as needed (Sporer and Schwandt, 2007; Leins et al., 2012). The
reverse chronological retelling of these liars might then be similar
in cognitive load to that of truth tellers doing the same.
DUAL-TASKING (DOING TWO THINGS AT ONCE)
Asking examinees to perform a concurrent task during interroga-
tion was a novel approach to load induction tested by Patterson
(2010). If lying draws more on attention and working memory
than truth telling, then a dual task might interfere more with the
former. In this study, truth tellers followed written instructions to
go to the university book store, perform specific tasks, and later
honestly describe and answer questions about what they did. Liars
were shown these instructions but prepared deceptive narratives as
if they had been followed, which they later conveyed and answered
questions about. During the interview phase, all participants had
to perform a concurrent math task. Math response times and
accuracies were the dependent measures. Regarding the results,
dual task interference was minimal. No liar-truth teller differences
were found for math response times, but there was slightly higher
math accuracy for truth tellers. Videos of selected interviews were
later shown to observers. When interviewees were engaged in a
secondary task, observers were slightly more accurate in assessing
the veracity of responses and attributed higher loads to liars. This
technique is innovative, and more research is needed. However, no
theoretical rationale was given for the choice of concurrent task,
which may partially explain the weak findings, a theme expanded
on later.
OVERALL EVALUATION OF LOAD-INDUCING PROPOSALS
Our general impression of the load-inducing approaches to date is
that they are innovative and promising. However, it is too soon
in their development to accurately gauge their applicability to
forensic settings and other real world contexts where detecting
deception is vital. Once again,more research is needed on their sus-
ceptibility to rehearsal and other countermeasures and on whether
the use of such countermeasure is detectable. Also, recall that most
of the studies above involved college students who were offered
extra credit in exchange for their participation. Their motivation
to succeed in their lies was low compared to actual perpetrators
trying to persuade detectives with their false alibis or innocent
suspects attempting to convince detectives of their innocence. The
cognitive loads of guilty liars and innocent truth tellers may both
be so high that load-inducing interventions do not differential well
between the two (Van Koppen, 2012; Vrij and Granhag, 2012a,b).
Research testing these techniques on authentic samples is clearly
needed.
A THEORETICAL TAXONOMY OF COGNITIVE LOAD-INDUCING
LIE DETECTION
Sufficient promising results have been published on load-inducing
lie detection (see Vrij et al., 2010a) to justify the proposal of a
theoretical taxonomy that can help organize, direct, and advance
future validation, refinement, and innovation. It is based on the
important distinctions of the type of cognitive load each pro-
posal induces, intrinsic versus extraneous, and how open-ended
are the responses each permits in examinees, closed-ended (e.g.,
short answers, key strokes) versus open-ended (e.g., narratives,
drawings).
Two key terms are first defined, both adapted from Cognitive
Load Theory (Merrienboer and Sweller, 2005).“Intrinsic cognitive
load” refers to the inherent demands on the cognitive resources of
attention and working memory needed to lie well. Items 1 through
9 of Table 1 convey some important factors adding to the intrin-
sic load of lying, organized by whether they relate to preparing a
deceptive message or to delivering the message to a target. “Extra-
neous cognitive load” means any demands on or loss of cognitive
resources due to tasks or factors external to the act of lying that
makes it more difficult. For example, extreme anxiety in an exami-
nee can decrease available cognitive resources, effectively imposing
cognitive load (see Item 10 of Table 1).
The extent to which Items 1 through 10 of Table 1 apply to an
instance of lying depends on the complexity of its social context
(DePaulo et al., 2004). Everyday lies are told without imposing
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Table 1 |The cognitive load of lying versus truth telling.
SOME FACTORSADDINGTOTHE COGNITIVE LOAD OF LYING*
Preparing a deceptive message
1. Does formation of the lie require that details be kept internally consistent (no contradictory information, Granhag and Hartwig, 2008)?
2. Is the narrative externally consistent (congruent with what the target knows; DePaulo et al., 2003)?
3. Is the narrative detailed enough with multimodal info., a realistic timeline, etc. to convince the target (Vrij et al., 2010a)?
4. Beyond going undetected, are lies based on the deceptive narrative likely to achieve the liar’s goal, for instance, obtaining money from a naïve target
(Walczyk et al., 2012)?
Appearing sincere while delivering a deceptive message to the target
5. Is the motivation high to lie successfully (Vrij and Mann, 2001)?
6. Not taking credibility for granted, how much monitoring of and control over the self is the liar exercising to appear truthful and to stay in the deceptive
role (Zuckerman et al., 1981; Buller and Burgoon, 1996; Vrij et al., 2010a)?
7. How much is the liar monitoring the target’s behavior to, see if the lie is believed (Buller and Burgoon, 1996; Vrij et al., 2008a, 2010a)?
8. Is the truth deeply entrenched, does it elicit strong emotions, or is honest responding well practiced so that proactive interference with deceptive
responding occurs (Lane and Wegner, 1995; Morgan et al., 2009; Osman et al., 2009; Walczyk et al., 2009)?
9. Is an adequate deceptive narrative unavailable or is the lie unrehearsed (Vrij et al., 2010a)?
10. Is the liar highly anxious (Eysenck, 1992; Beilock and Carr, 2005)?
SOME FACTORSADDINGTOTHE COGNITIVE LOAD OFTRUTHTELLING*
11. Does recalling the truth to working memory require retrieving memories that have not been accessed in a long time or details that have decayed
(Anderson, 2000; Wixted, 2004)?
12. Is a lie well rehearsed compared to its corresponding truth (O’Hair et al., 1981; Greene et al., 1985)?
13. Does a truthful response require elaboration or qualification to be accurately understood by the target compared to a corresponding lie (Gombos,
2006)?
14. Does a truthful response require the generation of a novel opinion, judgment, evaluation, attitude, or emotional reaction (DePaulo, 1992; DePaulo
et al., 2003; Gombos, 2006)?
15. Is the truth teller highly motivated to be believed (Van Koppen, 2012; Vrij and Granhag, 2012a,b)?
*These lists are not exhaustive.
high cognitive loads. Liars typically have little concern about
getting caught and rarely monitor their behavior or the targets’
(DePaulo et al., 1996). Thus, few items apply. However, serious lies
have greater interpersonal consequences and entail heavier loads
(DePaulo et al., 2004; Burgoon and Buller, 2008). More items will
apply, especially when lying is spontaneous. On the other hand,
skilled or well rehearsed liars telling serious lies may not need to
monitor their behavior or the targets’ (Items 6 and 7), instead
relying on their fluent delivery to carry them through (DePaulo,
1992).
For cognitive load-inducing lie detection to succeed, it is impor-
tant to note when truth telling imposes a greater cognitive load
than telling a corresponding lie. For instance, Walczyk et al. (2005)
found that college students took longer to recall their actual stan-
dardized test scores than to lie about them. The bottom of Table 1
lists five factors adding to the cognitive load of honesty. Only when
they can be discounted during an examination is lying more likely
to manifest in heightened load indices. For instance, questions
asked in load-inducing lie detection exams need to be written
with Items 11 through 15 in mind so that the cognitive load of
lying is higher than for truth telling.
Table 2 provides the full Taxonomy of Load-Inducing Lie
Detection and shows where the proposals above and others to
be discussed fall within it. Despite the severe limitations of some
of them, all proposals are included for the sake of comprehen-
siveness. A question that should guide their refinement is “Under
what testing conditions are cognitive load indices unambiguous cues
to deception?” To illustrate, such a condition is when “prompting”
occurs, which makes cognitive load indices clearer cues by reduc-
ing the need for all examinees to search memory for a truth and
by reducing the emotional surprise to questions during the exam
(Walczyk et al., 2005).
INTRINSIC COGNITIVE LOAD-INDUCING TECHNIQUES
The proposals under this heading seek to make the act of lying
harder by surprising examinees cognitively with test items, with
the memory task used to access the truth, or by requiring quick
responses. TRI-Con, which elicits closed-ended responses, falls
into this category. When examinees have not anticipated the ques-
tions, they must decide which ones to lie to and generate deceptive
answers on the fly, all adding to cognitive load (Walczyk et al.,
2005, 2009). Vrij et al.’s (2008b) proposal of having examinees
convey narratives in reverse chronological order fits here, as does
instructing them unexpectedly to draw pictures (Vrij et al., 2009).
Memories related to the truth are being probed in unusual ways
that liars may not have anticipated. Because narratives and draw-
ings can be as elaborate as examinees choose, we consider them
to be open-ended. Examinees can pace themselves, monitor, and
control their behavior, hopefully causing related cues to emerge
(DePaulo et al., 2003).
Although not specifically proposed as a load-inducing tech-
nique, Seymour et al. (2000) tested a variant of the GKT with
response time as the cue to deception, the Response Time GKT,
which qualifies as one. Participants partook in a mock crime
www.frontiersin.org February 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 14 | 7
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Walczyk et al. Cognitive load-induced lie detection
Table 2 | A taxonomy of load-inducing lie detection: the type of cognitive load induced and the response open-endedness permitted.
Intrinsic load Extraneous load
Closed-ended responding (encourages the leakage of hard-to-control non-verbal cues and blurting of the truth)
TRI-Con Maintain eye contact
Answering unanticipated short-answer questions about minor details Dual-tasking-articulartory suppression, n-back task
Implicit personality/attitude tests Dual-tasking-operate driving simulator or do a concurrent math task
Autobiographical implicit association tests Have examinee give short answers in front of a mirror
Response time GKT
Open-ended responding (encourages verbal signs of deception, monitoring of self and the target, signs of the attempted control of behavior)
Have examinee relate surprise narrative Maintain eye contact
Surprise task of examinees drawing picture of alibi Have examinees give narrative answers or draw pictures in front of a mirror
Recall events in reverse chronological order Dual-tasking-operate driving simulator or do a concurrent math task
Recall from a different physical perspective
involving a computer. They also learned two-word phrases related
to the crime as well as other two-word phrases later in the experi-
ment. During a subsequent phrase classification task, with instruc-
tions to respond as quickly as possible, participants were asked to
press a key with their right index finger if an item was on the list
that had been learned later. All other items required a key press
with their left index finger, some of which were from the mock
crime. The latter responses were the equivalent of having to con-
ceal guilty knowledge. Responding to guilty knowledge items took
about 300 ms. longer than responding to neutral items. Discrim-
inant analyses correctly classified guilty and innocent trials 95%
accurately.
Self-report measures of personality and attitudes (e.g., toward
members of minority groups) are highly susceptible to deception
as some examinees respond to test items to create a false posi-
tive image of themselves to obtain jobs and other rewards. Even
so, their actual personalities and attitudes are rehearsed through
repeated ways of thinking and acting in their daily lives that form
strong associations among ideas and emotions in memory (Banse
and Greenwald, 2007). Although not proposed as a load-inducing
technique either, as an alternative to self-report measures, Implicit
Personality and Attitude Tests qualify as well. They put exami-
nees under time pressure in responding (Banse and Greenwald,
2007). This increases intrinsic cognitive load by making it harder
to deceive. For dishonest examinees, a proactive interference can
occur when their true attitudes and personalities conflict with the
impressions they want to make, which usually manifests as slower
response times for items lied to. Moreover, responses are typically
closed-ended, limited to a forced choice between two options.
How quickly individuals respond, for example, when instructed
to associate the word “good” with the faces of individuals with
dark complexions co-presented on a computer screen among
many pairings of stimuli, can reveal racism in those respond-
ing slowly. This technique has been used successfully in employe
selection (Banse and Greenwald, 2007). A variant of it, the auto-
biographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT), was proposed and
examined by Sartori et al. (2008). It requires examinees to respond
rapidly to test sentences presented one at a time on a computer
screen describing autobiographical events that are either true or
false for them. Across six experiments, aIAT had accuracies up
to 91% in revealing concealed knowledge of true autobiographic
events. Still, when examinees use the countermeasure of strate-
gically slowing down when responding truthfully, this accuracy
drops dramatically (Verschuere et al., 2009).
We now propose another way of accessing truths that could
impose higher intrinsic load on liars and may inspire the develop-
ment of similar proposals by others. It is based on the encoding-
specificity hypothesis (see Anderson, 2000) and part of the “Cog-
nitive Interview,” a well validated set of four memory strategies
for assisting individuals in recalling accurately and fully prior
events, without inducing memory distortions (Fisher and Geisel-
man, 1992; Geiselman and Fisher, 1997). First, the interviewer tries
to reinstate the physical and mental state of the witnessed event,
for instance, by asking the interviewee to form a mental picture
of the context of the event and recall how she/he felt. Second, the
interviewee is encouraged to recall every detail of an event she/he
can, even seemingly insignificant memory fragments. By the third
principle, the interviewee is encouraged to recall in a variety of
temporal orders. Recall that a variant of this principle was applied
to lie detection by Vrij et al. (2008b), specifically recounting in
reverse chronological order. Fourth, the interviewee is encouraged
to recall from a variety of physical locations, for instance, from
how things would have appeared “if you had been looking down
on the room where the crime occurred from directly above” or
“if you had looked at the room from the perpetrator’s perspec-
tive.” The latter principle, too, might be applied to lie detection.
If asked to recall from different perspectives, truth tellers should
have narratives richer in realistic details that are delivered with
fewer hesitations than liars (Sporer and Schwandt, 2007).
EXTRANEOUS COGNITIVE LOAD-INDUCING TECHNIQUES
Techniques under this heading seek to induce cognitive load selec-
tively on liars, not by making it harder to lie, but by altering other
aspects of the examination procedure or context. “Dual-tasking”
was one such proposal considered earlier that is now discussed
more deeply. Cognitive scientists have long used this research par-
adigm to determine when different tasks use a common system
or pool of resources (Pashler, 1994; Baddeley, 1996). As a tech-
nique for lie detection, it can be used with test items soliciting
closed-ended or open-ended responses (Patterson, 2010). Vrij et al.
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(2008a) suggested that examinees could “recall their stories whilst
conducting a computer driving simulation task at the same time”
(p. 41). If deception imposes greater load, then the simulation
may interfere more with liars, enhancing cognitive cues. To our
knowledge, this study has not been done, but is worth testing.
Meyer and Kieras (1997) evaluated various theoretical accounts
of multi-task interference. Of them, Unitary Resource Theory is
the one that Patterson (2010) and Vrij et al. (2008a) implicitly
subscribe to with their proposals. Its basic assumptions are that
(a) attentional capacity is a limited general resource that can be
assigned to multiple tasks. (b) The amount of attention allocated
depends on the demands of the current activities. (c) Under low
levels of task load, attention can easily be divided between tasks,
not so when either or both of the tasks are difficult. (d) Finally,
attention is controllable and can be allocated dynamically. Meyer
and Kieras (1997) also review the major criticisms of this account.
The one that is most problematic for the proposals above con-
cerns “difficulty insensitivity.” Varying the difficulty of a primary
task often does not interfere with a concurrent task, which should
occur if both are dependent on a central, limited resource. For
instance, difficulty insensitivity was apparently the case with Pat-
terson (2010), who found that lying was minimally disruptive of a
concurrent math task.
A powerful framework for understanding multi-task interfer-
ence effects, which we embrace, is Adaptive Executive Control
(AEC; Meyer and Kieras, 1997; Meyer et al., 2002). It overcomes
the criticisms of Unitary Resource Theory, is instructive regard-
ing what concurrent tasks theoretically should interfere with lying
more than truth telling, and is well supported. Five components
underlie the framework. (a) It is based on a comprehensive infor-
mation processing architecture that incorporates all of the known
characteristics of human cognition. (b) It is also based on a pro-
duction system formalism that expresses actions as If-Then rules,
which succinctly capture procedural knowledge. The “If” part
specifies the conditions under which actions are executed. The
“Then” portion specifies the actions in their proper order. (c)
Importantly, no assumption of a limited general cognitive resource
or capacity is made. (d) Rather, AEC attributes dual task interfer-
ence to the flexible strategies individuals adopt to fulfill their task
priorities as handled by supervisory executive processes. In effect,
one task is put on hold while another task higher in priority takes
precedence and executes. (e) Finally, AEC explicitly takes account
of the constraints in processing imposed by perceptual and motor
systems during multi-task performance. For instance, concurrent
tasks both requiring verbal responses will naturally interfere. A
higher priority utterance will precede the lower priority utter-
ance. Those interested in AEC are referred to Meyer and Kieras
(1997) as well as Meyer et al. (2002). To summarize, the major
sources of interference are competition between concurrent tasks
for the same perceptual or motor response systems or the execu-
tive process performing one task before another due to its higher
priority given the performer’s goals. If the AEC framework is valid,
then the dual-tasking, load-inducing proposals above are unlikely
to be effective, because competition for a limited central resource,
as they intend, is not the basis of interference.
We now propose a potentially interfering task suggested by
the Working Memory Model of deception (Sporer and Schwandt,
2006, 2007). It does not assume a competition for limited atten-
tion. Rather, it prevents liars from using a specialized working
memory store needed for lying. In research on working memory’s
phonological loop, articulatory suppression prevents the rehearsal
of memory items (Baddeley, 1996), for instance, by instructing
participants to continuously repeat a simple word such as “one.”
However, repeating a single, familiar syllable might quickly become
automated and be minimally disruptive of lying. Having to repeat
a sequence of unfamiliar syllables, such as “Bah-Bay-Boo-Bee,”
would lessen this problem (Gordon and Meyer, 1987). Will con-
tinuously repeating such a sequence interfere more with lying? To
test whether, a study can be conducted in which recorded questions
are asked through headphones and answers, yes or no, are given
non-verbally as keystrokes so as not to impair articulatory suppres-
sion. Thus, responding is closed-ended. According to the Working
Memory Model, lying requires more access than truth telling to an
unencumbered phonological loop for language production. If so,
then when articulatory suppression is added, lying should entail
longer response times, more pupil dilation, and less blinking than
truth telling due to interference caused by competition for this spe-
cialized working memory store. Another theoretically based dual
task was tested by Ambach et al. (2011) with the GKT: the n-back
procedure (deciding whether a stimulus was presented n trials
previously). Both tasks were hypothesized to compete for work-
ing memory’s central executive. The n-back task enhanced the
detection of concealed knowledge as measured by electrodermal
activity. Researchers are encouraged to follow these two examples
and develop other theoretically based dual task proposals.
Requiring examinees to hold eye contact with the examiner
can impose extraneous cognitive load in liars, perhaps by provok-
ing anxiety and an allocation of cognitive resources to monitor
the self and the target (Vrij et al., 2010b). As noted previously,
this load-inducing technique may not work well with members of
some cultures and possibly other segments of the general popula-
tion for whom maintaining eye contact goes against a social norm
(McCarthy et al., 2006). When it is appropriate, it can be used with
closed- and open-ended responses. Another way to induce extra-
neous cognitive load on liars might be to have examinees answer
questions while sitting in front of a mirror, which could increase
their self-monitoring and the emergence of related cues (Buller
and Burgoon, 1996). An examiner would still be needed in the
room. This proposal has not been tested.
COMBINING INTRINSIC AND EXTRANEOUS TECHNIQUES; OPEN- AND
CLOSED-ENDED RESPONDING
Intrinsic and extraneous load-inducing techniques can be com-
bined in an exam, thereby gaining the advantages of each. For
example, examinees can be tested under the intrinsic load-
inducing conditions of TRI-Con while following instructions to
maintain eye contact with the interrogator (Vrij et al., 2010b).
Unanticipated questions about spatial information and other
details can be asked. Examinees can also be asked to draw pictures
of the physical layout (Vrij et al., 2009).
Closed- and open-ended items can also complement each other
(Toris and DePaulo, 1984). Recall that TRI-Con is intended to
assess the truthfulness of the short answers given to closed-ended
questions, which allows unambiguous assessment of the cognitive
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load needed to answer using response time, pupil dilation, and
other load indices. Moreover, the time pressure on responding
may increase leakage of non-verbal cues, which manifest primar-
ily under high cognitive load (Buller and Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon
and Buller, 2008) and may increase the chance that a truth is inad-
vertently blurted (Lane and Wegner, 1995). On the other hand,
open-ended questions eliciting narratives can be rich in verbal cues
such as vagueness and dissociations (Buller and Burgoon, 1996;
Burgoon and Buller, 2008) and in signs of the attempted control
of behavior by liars (DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer and Schwandt,
2006; Vrij et al., 2010a). Interrogators might, for example, have a
suspect provide a narrative of an alibis at the time of the crime,
followed by a TRI-Con exam with questions probing details of an
alibi. If the verbal and control cues from the open-ended portion
and the cognitive load indices of the closed-ended questioning all
point to deception, strong converging evidence will exist. Also, the
more reliable cues to deception used, the more accurate its detec-
tion tends to be (DePaulo et al., 2003). It may be worthwhile to
combine psycho-physiological and cognitive load cues to enhance
lie detection.
ADVANCING COGNITIVE LIE DETECTION BY AVOIDING THE
PITFALLS OF THE CQT
Four recommendations for researchers and practitioners and their
justifications appear below to help the emerging field of cognitive
lie detection to avert four of the major weaknesses of the CQT
(National Research Council, 2003) and profit from the strengths
of the GKT. To recall the criticisms, the CQT is not based on
a validated theory and is easily susceptible to countermeasures.
Its administration has not been standardized, and the scoring of
results is largely subjective.
1. Cognitive load-inducing lie detection techniques should be
based on explicitly stated, well-specified, and validated cog-
nitive models of deception (see McCornack, 1997). To many
readers this recommendation may be obvious. However, to date,
few load-inducing techniques are based on models or theories that
were made explicit in the research reports. Perhaps the models
were implicit in some cases, but this is not helpful to readers
wishing to understand the reasons why load-inducing manipu-
lations work or when experimental findings apply to authentic
settings. In fact, historically many researchers have sought out
reliable cues to deception with minimal regard for their basis
in theory (DePaulo et al., 2003). This risks repeating this mis-
take of the CQT with load-inducing lie detection. Recall that
refined cognitive models, supported by data, can illuminate
the conditions when load-inducing interventions are likely to
succeed, necessary for generalizing the results of experiments
to the field (Vrij et al., 2008a). Since deception is multifari-
ous (e.g., verbal, non-verbal, lies of omission) and is driven
by many motives (e.g., protect another, conceal wrongdoing,
exploit others; DePaulo et al., 2004), no single cognitive account
can explain all of its forms (Ekman, 2001; DePaulo et al., 2003).
The accounts we reviewed can serve as building blocks for
narrowly focused models directly applicable to specific authen-
tic contexts like the interrogation room of a police department.
To recap those we regard as most applicable, the PTS model
specifies the response competition that occurs when examinees
falsely deny possessing guilty knowledge. Response compe-
tition also likely underlies much of lying, especially when
deceiving about well practiced truths. Interpersonal Decep-
tion Theory (Buller and Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon and Buller,
2008) highlights the cognitive load of having to monitor the
behavior of the self and the target and postulates the leak-
age of cues under high cognitive load. DePaulo’s (1992) Self-
Presentation Theory posits the leakage of cues and delineates
between non-verbal behaviors that are easy to control versus
those that are not, the latter providing the best cues. Sporer and
Schwandt (2006, 2007)’s Working Memory Model elaborates
on the sources of information (e.g., scripts, personal memo-
ries) used in lie construction. The ADCM is informative about
the encoding and retrieval processes related to truth telling, the
decision to lie, and lie construction and offers insights regard-
ing the rehearsal of deception (Walczyk et al., 2009, 2012). The
Preoccupation Model of Secrecy advances understanding of
why cognitive resources are often needed to inhibit truthful
responding. Still, these cognitive accounts must be expanded
to address the motivation to lie, rehearsal, and other important
moderators of cues to deception to be maximally relevant to lie
detection (DePaulo et al., 2003).
2. Countermeasures will be devised by deceptive examinees for
beating any new method of lie detection as knowledge of
it disseminates, nor can this be entirely prevented (Lykken,
1998; National Research Council, 2003; Rosenfeld et al., 2004;
Simpson, 2008; Verschuere et al., 2009; Ganis et al., 2011).
Researchers and practitioners concerned with cognitive load-
inducing lie detection should note that the rehearsal of decep-
tion is a serious countermeasure, continue to find ways to
minimize it, as well as ways to expose rehearsal when it occurs.
Other countermeasures need to be uncovered as well. If this
recommendation too seems obvious, it is noteworthy that few
studies testing load-inducing techniques have seriously considered
rehearsal or included a rehearsal condition in the research. We
discussed several load-inducing proposals to minimize it such
as surprising examinees with test items, with memory tasks,
or having examinees respond quickly. Still, rehearsal cannot be
prevented completely. Constructing deceptive narratives before
an exam as well as anticipating questions and preparing decep-
tive answers are likely in intelligent, motivated liars (Vrij and
Mann, 2001; Vrij et al., 2010a).
The countermeasure of the rehearsal of deception can be
overcome if research can identify “behavioral signatures” that it
occurred. More research is needed on the effects of this counter-
measure on pupil dilation, voice pitch, response time, blinking
rate, and other correlates of cognitive load. Some encourag-
ing findings are that rehearsed liars can have response times
falling below those of unrehearsed liars and truth tellers (O’Hair
et al., 1981; Greene et al., 1985), as well as reduced eye move-
ments so they can focus on memory retrieval undistracted
by the visual environment (Walczyk et al., 2012). Rehearsed
liars also have brain activation patterns distinguishable from
those of unrehearsed liars and truth tellers (Ganis et al., 2003).
The more distinguishing cues that can be developed, the more
accurately rehearsed deception can be exposed (DePaulo et al.,
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2003). Research on the effects of other countermeasures, such
as intentionally not complying with instructions to maintain
eye context or answer quickly (Verschuere et al., 2009), may
reveal distinctive cognitive-behavioral signatures too.
3. Research shows that even law enforcement officers, among
other human observers, generally make poor lie detectors
(Ekman and O’Sullivan, 1991; Garrido et al., 2004; Bond and
DePaulo, 2006, 2008). This is partly because people tend to
focus on unreliable cues like gaze aversion or nervousness and
miss genuine cues that are often subtle (DePaulo et al., 2003).
From police detectives interviewing witnesses to federal agents
interrogating suspected terrorists, human lie detectors will be
relevant for the foreseeable future. Most of the studies on induc-
ing cognitive load we reviewed have wisely sought to improve
the accuracy of human observers, but still report detection rates
that are rather low (Vrij et al., 2010a).
Cognitive load-inducing lie detection involving closed-
ended responding offers an alternative to both the CQT and
the use of human lie detectors. Recall that administration of
the CQT hasn’t been standardized. To elaborate,
most polygraph testing procedures allow for uncontrolled
variation in test administration (e.g., creation of the emo-
tional climate, selecting questions) that can be expected to
result in variations in accuracy and limit the level of accu-
racy that can be consistently achieved (National Research
Council, 2003, p. 213).
The guidelines of TRI-Con and those that might result from
refinement of other closed-ended, load-inducing proposals,
such as the aIAT and the Response Time GKT, can help stan-
dardize lie detection. This does not mean imposing a “pre-
dictability” that liars can rely on to foil exams. For instance,
unanticipated questions can still be asked. Rather, standardiza-
tion means following procedures that disambiguate cognitive
load indices as cues to deception. TRI-Con, for instance, can
be implemented on a laptop computer. Reading and computer
skills are not required. Examinees wear a microphone-headset
connected to a computer. Questions can be digitally recorded in
advance. The assessment of answer response times, pupil dila-
tion, voice pitch elevation, and other cues can be automated
with technology now available (Walczyk et al., 2012). Accord-
ingly, we recommend that lie detection exams be developed or
further refined to follow standardized cognitive load-inducing
procedures and that they be as automated as possible to sidestep
the severe limitations of human lie detectors. Human exam-
iners should still be present to oversee administration. Their
presence can also induce load selectively on liars as deceptive
examinees may feel compelled to monitor them for signs of
suspiciousness (Burgoon and Buller, 2008).
4. Appropriate automated analytical procedures should be used to
determine the “deceptiveness” or “honesty” of answers. A bene-
fit of standardizing and automating lie detection and assessing
the changes in cognitive load between known truthful answers
and those suspected of deception is that statistical or other ana-
lytic procedures can be used to“decide”if examinees are lying or
truth telling. This avoids the subjective scoring of the polygraph
(Iacono and Lykken, 1997; Lykken, 1998; National Research
Council, 2003). Of course, data must be collected on authentic
samples of liars and truth tellers who are highly motivated to
convince authorities.
CONCLUSION
The polygraph-based CQT lacks a strong scientific basis (Iacono
and Lykken, 1997; Lykken, 1998; National Research Council,
2003), unlike the more successful GKT. We believe that cogni-
tive load-inducing techniques are promising alternatives to the
CQT, especially if lessons can be learned from the latter. To help
them advance, we reviewed many models and theories relevant
to the cognition of deception, their implications for lie detection,
and evaluated specific proposals for selectively inducing cogni-
tive load on liars, particularly their susceptibility to rehearsal and
other countermeasures. The taxonomy proposed classifies these
proposals according to the type of cognitive load induced and
the breadth of the responses permitted, which may help orga-
nize and advance the field by opening up new research areas.
Along these lines, new proposals were also suggested. Finally,
four recommendations were shared to assist this promising gen-
eral approach in averting the corresponding pitfalls of the CQT.
To date, researchers in this area often have not heeded warn-
ing implicit in the report of the National Research Council
(2003).
Another contribution of this article is its modest attempt
to merge the seemingly disparate fields of “polygraph-based lie
detection” on the one hand and “social-cognitive perspectives on
deception” on the other. As we have argued, the former has a
long history (Lykken, 1998) with many valuable lessons for under-
standing deception and advancing lie detection. Scholars from
each perspective are encouraged to consider research and theory
from the other perspective for useful insights and opportunities
for cross-fertilization.
Finally, there are several obstacles to societal acceptance of
new forensic tools like these cognitive load-inducing lie detection
proposals. Will judges, lawyers, solicitors, police officers, victims,
suspects, or witnesses accept them? Recalling events in reverse
chronological order, drawing pictures, the guidelines of TRI-Con,
maintaining eye contact, or answering questions while perform-
ing a concurrent task might be rejected for lacking face validity.
The most formidable obstacles come with legal tests like the
US Supreme Court’s 1993 decision of “Daubert v. Merrill Dow
Pharmaceuticals” on the admissibility of scientific evidence in
the courtroom. A new method that gives rise to such evidence
must (a) have been empirically tested within the applicable field
as described in publications in peer-reviewed outlets, (b) have a
known potential error rate, (c) have established standards and
safeguards for its use, and (d) be widely accepted within the scien-
tific community (Solomon and Hackett, 1996). Much refinement
and validation will be necessary to meet these standards. If load-
inducing techniques can do so, their acceptance by stake holders
will likely follow.
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